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Venture Capital and Firm Performance Over the Long-Run:
Evidence from High-Tech IPOs in the United States

James R. Brown*
Montana State University**

Despite widespread interest in the key role that venture capital plays in financing young, hightech firms, little is known about the relative performance of venture-backed firms over the longrun. Using data from the U.S. high-tech sector, this paper examines the performance and
financing of venture- and non-venture-backed firms during the decade following their IPO.
Venture-backed firms survive longer, grow faster, are more R&D intensive, have generally
superior operating performance, raise more external equity, and have a greater cumulative impact
on the U.S. high-tech sector. These findings suggest that the true legacy of venture capital
finance extends well beyond the IPO.
Introduction
Firms that relied on venture capital for their early-stage, private financing have had an
unmistakable impact on economic activity and now dominate many of the most innovative and
dynamic industries in the U.S. economy. Between 1975 and 2003 more than 2,400 venturebacked firms undertook an initial public offering, and approximately 60% of these firms were
located in seven key high-tech industries.1 At the end of 2003 venture-backed firms accounted
for over 20% of the publicly traded firms in the U.S., represented over 25% of the market value
of publicly traded firms, and were responsible for more than 12% of sales. In the high-tech
sector venture-backed firms have had an even more dramatic effect—in 2003 venture-backed
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firms accounted for 70% of the market value of publicly traded computer software firms, for
example, and were responsible for over 50% of sales and over 60% of R&D in the computer
hardware industry.2
This activity has attracted widespread attention. An impressive literature has emerged
documenting the key role that venture capitalists play in financing and monitoring private, startup firms, and ultimately helping them undertake an initial public offering (IPO) (e.g., Gompers
and Lerner (1999 and 2001)). Recent studies using U.S. data suggest that venture capitalist
financing and involvement has a positive impact on the early development of the firm. Hellmann
and Puri (2000, 2002), for example, find that venture-backed start-ups bring products to market
faster and have a more fully developed internal organization than non-venture-backed start-ups.
There is also evidence that venture-backed firms perform better than their non-venture-backed
counterparts in the period of time immediately surrounding the IPO (Jain and Kini (1995)).
Much less is known, however, about the growth and performance of venture-backed firms over
longer periods following the IPO.
The objective of this paper is to examine the magnitude and duration of any performance
differences that exist between venture- and non-venture-backed firms in the decade following the
IPO. Specifically, the analysis focuses on survival, growth, R&D intensity, operating
performance, use of external financing, and cumulative impact on the U.S. high-tech sector. The
study is based on U.S. firms that went public between 1980 and 1989 in seven key high-tech
industries. In addition to results for the full sample of high-tech IPOs, separate findings are
presented for a small sample of venture- and non-venture-backed firms carefully matched based
on three-digit industry and firm size prior to the IPO. The matched sample methodology, also
employed by Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Jain and Kini (1995), provides a check on the
full sample results and helps ensure that the venture-backed firms are evaluated against a set of
non-venture-backed firms that are otherwise as similar as possible.
Whether or not venture-backed firms will outperform in the years following their IPO is
an interesting empirical question. Addressing this issue provides a more complete assessment of
the true legacy of venture capital financing, and contributes to the emerging literature on the
impact that venture backing has on the post-IPO firm. In addition, the venture capital industry is
cyclical and both regionally and internationally concentrated.3 As a result, many firms do not
have access to venture capital finance, even in economies where venture financing is relatively
abundant. Knowledge about the performance of venture-backed firms over time is important for
evaluating whether or not non-venture-backed firms face serious competitive disadvantages, and
for understanding why some countries may have difficulty specializing in the production of hightech goods. Finally, there are many public policy efforts, both in the U.S. and abroad, designed
to increase access to private venture capital, or even to supply some form of public venture
financing.4 A better understanding of the long-run relative performance of venture-backed firms
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These statistics were computed using data from Compustat and Venture Economics. Gompers and Lerner (2001)
report similar figures for 2000.
3
For information on the cyclical nature of the venture capital industry see chapter six in Gompers and Lerner
(2001), and for information on regional concentration see chapter one in Gompers and Lerner (1999). For
differences in venture capital financing across countries see Jeng and Wells (2000).
4
Lerner (2002) and Gompers and Lerner (2001, Chapter 9) discuss efforts in the U.S. See Bottazzi and Da Rin
(2002 and 2003) for a discussion of efforts in Europe.
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will help evaluate the merits of these programs, and may even inform their design and
implementation.
The paper begins with a discussion of the factors that may cause venture- and nonventure-backed firms to perform differently over the long-run. Section two discusses data
sources and the sample of IPOs examined, as well as differences between venture- and nonventure-backed firms the year prior to the IPO. The IPO itself and the impact it has on the
issuing firm is examined in section three. Section four considers firm survival in the decade
following the IPO, while section five evaluates firm performance and financing in the post-IPO
period. Section six provides a brief look at the cumulative impact that venture- and non-venturebacked IPOs from the 1980s have had on the U.S. high-tech sector, and section seven concludes
the paper.
Overall, this study documents large and persistent differences in the performance and
financing of venture- and non-venture-backed firms. Most notably, venture-backed firms
survive longer, have significantly faster rates of growth for almost a decade following the IPO,
and have much higher R&D and capital spending to sales ratios in the post-IPO period. In
addition, venture-backed firms generally exhibit superior operating performance after the IPO
(though not dramatically so), and they appear to have greater access to external sources of
finance after the IPO, particularly external equity. Because of their superior performance, by
2003 the share of high-tech sales, R&D and market value accounted for by venture-backed IPOs
from the 1980s was many times larger than the share accounted for by firms that received no
venture capital. These findings, which suggest that the true legacy of venture capital finance
extends well beyond the IPO, raise interesting questions about the factors responsible for such
large and persistent performance differences, and should be of keen interest to any country or
region interested in the production of high-tech goods.
I.

Should Venture-Backed Firms Outperform Over the Long-Run?
Evidence on the long-run relative performance of venture-backed firms is limited,
especially with respect to the real side of the firm in the years after the IPO. Jain and Kini
(1995) found that venture-backed firms in the U.S. had a significantly less severe decline in
operating performance as they moved through the IPO, and significantly faster sales growth in
the three years immediately following the IPO. Gompers and Lerner (2001) compared the buyand-hold returns of venture- and non-venture-backed IPOs between 1976 and 1999 and found
that venture-backed IPOs had significantly higher returns, especially during the mid- to late-90s.
Brav and Gompers (1997) found that the superior stock price performance of venture-backed
IPOs during the 1972-1992 period disappeared when the returns were weighted by the size of the
offering. In the U.S. the general perception appears to be that venture-backed firms are superior,
but this remains an open empirical question.5
A. Why Venture-Backed Firms Might Outperform
There are a number of reasons to believe that venture-backed firms will outperform nonventure-backed firms in the years following the IPO. In particular, venture capital directly
relaxes the financing constraints that many young, high-tech firms face. With this financing,
5

Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002 and 2003) note that this is a common perception in Europe as well. The evidence they
present, however, indicates that venture-backed firms raise more funds from the IPO but do not exhibit significantly
faster growth immediately thereafter.
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venture-backed firms are in a position to fund growth options when they arise, and it enables
them to make the necessary investments in equipment, personnel and R&D that will drive the
long-run performance of the firm. Because non-venture-backed firms must assemble financing
from other sources, key investments may be delayed, under-funded, or even abandoned.
Gompers and Lerner (2001, p. 62) note that venture-backed firms ―can grow more quickly and
uniformly because the assurance of future financing if they reach their milestones releases them
from having to track down new money.‖ Additionally, as Brav and Gompers (1997) discuss,
venture capitalists might continue to relax financing constraints well after the firm goes public.
There is some evidence that venture-backed firms are able to issue public equity at a lower total
cost than non-venture-backed firms (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991)), and venture backing
might also make other forms of external finance more accessible.
Venture capital financing is especially important to firms in the high-tech sector because
these firms have the most difficulty obtaining more traditional sources of external finance, such
as debt or public equity. External finance is often unavailable or prohibitively expensive for
high-tech firms because they are very risky, they have few tangible assets, and there is a great
deal of asymmetric information between the owners of the firm and outsiders about the firm‘s
prospects.6 Venture capitalists have developed several techniques to overcome these information
asymmetries, such as carefully screening the firms they invest in, staging the investments they
make over time, and tying the entrepreneur‘s compensation to the performance of the firm.7
Venture capitalists also regularly visit and closely monitor the firms they finance (Gorman and
Shalman (1989)), allowing them to finance high-growth firms that would otherwise be capital
constrained.
Such active monitoring and close involvement appear to be the characteristics that
separate venture capitalists from other suppliers of finance, such as private ―angel‖ investors.
The nature and extent of venture capitalist involvement varies, but, as Kortum and Lerner (2000,
p. 676) note, the venture capitalist ―is typically active as a director, an advisor, or even a
manager of the firm.‖8 Gompers and Lerner (1999) discuss how venture capitalists are able to
use the positions they occupy on the board of directors to exert considerable influence over the
firms they finance, even replacing the original CEO (who is often the founder). 9 Hellmann
(2000) refers to venture capitalists as ―coaches‖ that provide assistance on everything from
strategy and recruitment to marketing and basic bookkeeping. Gompers and Lerner (2001, p. 64)
claim that the venture capitalist provides ―guidance, monitoring, shaping of management teams
and boards, networking, and credibility‖ to the early development of the firm. They also discuss
(p. 43) the ―essential competitive advantage‖ that venture backing provides, enabling a company
to ―stand a much better chance of succeeding in the marketplace.‖10
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See Carpenter and Petersen (2002a) for a discussion of the importance of equity finance, and more discussion of
the reasons that high-tech firms have difficulty obtaining external finance.
7
For a more thorough discussion of the mechanisms venture capitalists employ to overcome these information
asymmetries, see Gompers and Lerner (1999, pp. 130-132). See Gompers (1995) for evidence on how venture
capitalists use staging to monitor and gather information from portfolio firms.
8
For evidence on venture capitalist representation on the board of directors see Lerner (1995) and Mikkelson et al.
(1997).
9
Hellmann and Puri (2000) present evidence indicating that the founder of a venture-backed firm is, in fact, more
likely to be replaced than the founder of a non-venture-backed firm.
10
Hsu (2004, p. 1805) presents evidence suggesting that ―VCs ―extra-financial‖ value may be more distinctive than
their functionally equivalent financial capital.‖
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Recent studies suggest that venture backing does have a positive impact on the early
development of the firm. Hellmann and Puri (2000) find that venture backing reduces the time it
takes for innovative companies to take a product to market; and, in a separate study, Hellmann
and Puri (2002) find that venture-backed start-ups have a more fully developed internal
organization than non-venture-backed start-ups. There is also evidence that venture capitalists
remain actively involved with the firms they finance, even in the years following the IPO. For
example, in 89% of the cases examined by Barry et al. (1990) the lead venture capitalist
remained on the firm‘s board of directors one year after the IPO. Additionally, a recent study by
Hochberg (2005) found that venture backing had a positive impact on corporate governance after
the firm had gone public. It is not clear whether venture backing will have a positive impact on
firm performance over the long-run as well, but the general perception appears to be, as Gompers
and Lerner (2001, p. 64) suggest, that ―the early participation of venture firms…helps innovators
sustain their success long after their company issues an IPO.‖
B. Why Venture-Backed Firms Might Not Outperform
There are, however, reasons to believe that venture involvement might actually be
detrimental to the long-run performance of the firm. In order to obtain venture capital the
entrepreneur is forced to give up not only a share of ownership in the firm, but also a
considerable amount of control over the future direction of the firm. Because the entrepreneur‘s
incentives are no longer as closely aligned with the success of the firm, the performance of the
firm may suffer, especially if the entrepreneur, and the entrepreneur‘s human capital, were to
leave the firm.11 Conflicts between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur might also develop,
which, as Bygrave and Timmons (1992) have discussed, can certainly harm the progress of the
firm.12 Hellmann and Puri (2000) also note that there are substantial costs involved when the
entrepreneur is forced to spend a great deal of time meeting with and appeasing the ever-present
venture capitalist.13
Venture capitalists might also have a negative impact on long-run performance if they are
overly focused on maximizing their returns over the short-run. Though venture capitalists do not
liquidate their ownership stake at the time of the IPO, they do typically sell (or distribute) most
of their holdings in the first few years thereafter. As Gompers and Lerner (1998) discuss,
venture funds are organized with a predefined lifetime, so venture capitalists must liquidate their
holdings, either by selling shares in the open market or distributing shares directly to the
investors.14 In the sample of share distributions they examine, the average time between the IPO
and the first share distribution is 1.69 years. They also find that venture capitalists distribute
almost all of their holdings at this time. In an effort to maximize the value of the firm in the first
or second year after the IPO, venture capitalists might encourage the firms they finance to delay
or abandon important investment projects, for example. While this may improve the market‘s
11

As Gompers and Lerner (2001) discuss, venture capitalists take great strides to keep this from happening, such as
ensuring that the entrepreneur retains a large equity stake in the firm.
12
They cite one CEO who claims that ―When negotiating with a venture capital firm I disregard what they say about
added value. My strategy is to minimize their value subtracted!‖
13
Gompers and Lerner (2001, p. 5) note that ―entrepreneurs have often felt that the terms demanded by venture
capitalists are far too onerous for the amount of capital they provide.‖ They add, however, that ―these claims have
little basis in reality.‖
14
They note that most funds have a ten year lifetime, with an option to extend for three additional years. For a
number of reasons, including insider selling rules and tax concerns, venture capitalists typically liquidate their
holdings by distributing shares directly to investors in the fund.
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perception of the company‘s balance sheet, and thereby increase the current stock price, it could
be detrimental to the long-run performance of the firm.15
A related concern is that venture capitalists may be inclined to take a firm public earlier
than would be optimal for the firm. Not only do venture capitalists make most of their money on
the firms in their portfolio that ultimately go public, but having a firm they financed reach the
IPO stage can be especially valuable when the venture capitalist attempts to raise additional
funds.16 So, venture capitalists (particularly younger ones) might engage in ―grandstanding‖ by
rushing a firm public. But a premature IPO could be very costly for the firm, resulting in greater
underpricing and ultimately diminishing the future growth rate of the firm. Gompers (1996)
finds that firms taken public by young venture capitalists are significantly younger, exhibit more
underpricing, and raise much less from the IPO than firms taken public by older, more
experienced, venture capitalists.17
C. Selection and Performance
Finally, performance differences might also arise because venture capitalists select which
firms they will finance, and some non-venture-backed firms may have explicitly chosen not to
seek venture funding. Venture capitalists finance a small fraction of the entrepreneurs that
approach them for financing, and they have developed careful screening methods to determine
which firms they will back (Gompers and Lerner (2001)). It is plausible to expect that venture
capitalists will identify and fund a high proportion of the most promising new opportunities; and,
if so, selection may be an important reason why venture-backed firms outperform non-venturebacked firms over time. It is also likely that some of the most promising firms will eschew
venture capital because of its very high cost (in terms of lost ownership and control).18 If the
best firms are able to finance their activities either internally or from other external sources and
are able to go public on their own, firms that received venture financing might exhibit
underperformance over time.
D. An Empirical Question
Ultimately, whether venture-backed firms will outperform the firms that received no
venture financing is an empirical question. The objective in the remainder of this paper is to
document the magnitude and persistence of any performance differences that exist between
venture- and non-venture-backed firms. As such, there is no attempt in the analysis that follows
to explain why the performance differences exist, or to evaluate the various factors that may be

15

Gompers and Lerner (1998) find that there is a significant decline in share price just after a distribution.
Jeng and Wells (2000) cite an early study by Venture Economics which found that after an average holding period
of 4.2 years venture capitalists earned, on average, 195% on the firms in their portfolios that reached the IPO stage.
The firms that were acquired, by comparison, were held on average 3.7 years and had an average return of only
40%.
17
It is important to note, however, that because venture capitalists take multiple firms public they have a reputation
to protect, and acquiring a reputation for window-dressing and/or rushing firms public could be quite damaging to
the venture capitalist over time. See Jain and Kini (1995) for a more thorough discussion, and for evidence that
venture-backed firms are less likely to engage in window-dressing just before IPO.
18
Megginson and Weiss (1991) report that ―venture capitalists expect to earn a compound annual return of 25 to
over 50 percent (depending on the stage of the investment) on their investments in private companies.‖ In addition,
―venture capitalists invariably structure their investments in such a way that most of the business and financial risk
is shifted to the entrepreneur.‖
16
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responsible. The findings presented here lay the groundwork for a careful analysis of these
questions in the future.
II.

Sample Description and Initial Firm Characteristics
A. Data Sources
The primary data sources used in the study are Thompson Financial‘s SDC database,
Venture Economics‘ VentureXpert database, and Compustat. The SDC database identifies the
firms undertaking an initial public offering and provides some basic characteristics about the
offer. The data from Venture Economics identifies which firms were financed with venture
capital, and (generally) reports the total amount of venture funding that was received. The
Compustat database is used to follow these firms in the years following the IPO. Coverage in
Compustat is therefore a necessary condition for being included in the sample.19 In order to
track post-IPO performance for at least a decade, the analysis focuses on firms that went public
between 1980 and 1989. Spinoffs and firms incorporated outside of the U.S are not included in
the sample.20
B. IPOs in the High-Tech Sector
As other researchers have noted, venture capitalists specialize in financing high-tech
firms (e.g., Gompers and Lerner (1999, Table 1.2)). In the U.S. during the 1980s, seven hightech industries accounted for over 55% of the venture-backed IPOs that took place, but only
around 19% of the offers that were not venture-backed. These industries are pharmaceuticals
(SIC 283), computers and office machines (SIC 357), communications equipment (SIC 366),
electronic components (SIC 367), measuring and controlling instruments (SIC 382), surgical and
medical instruments (SIC 384), and software and computer related services (SIC 737). Because
this is where venture capital activity is focused, and because of the worldwide interest in the
relationship between access to risk capital and high-tech production, the analysis is limited to
these seven industries in the high-tech sector. Overall, in this ‗full‘ sample of high-tech IPOs
from the 1980s, 422 firms were financed with venture capital and 388 were not. The largest
number of IPOs occurred in SIC 357 (computers and office machines) and in SIC 737 (software
and computer related services), while SIC 367 (electronic components) and SIC 382 (measuring
and controlling instruments) had the fewest. The share of venture- and non-venture-backed IPOs
was generally similar across the industries with the exception of computers and office machines
which had almost twice as many venture-backed offers.21
C. The Matched Sample of High-Tech IPOs
The first two columns of Table I contain information on key firm characteristics in the
year prior to the IPO for the full sample of high-tech IPOs. On average, the venture-backed
firms are much larger prior to the IPO (in terms of sales and assets) and raise much more from
19

A small fraction of the IPOs identified by the SDC database never show up in Compustat, or, if they do, coverage
begins more than one fiscal year after the IPO. These firms are immediately dropped. In constructing the matched
sample firms without Compustat coverage a year prior to the IPO are also dropped.
20
The SDC database (with some corrections) is used to identify spinoffs and the Compustat database to identify
firms incorporated outside of the U.S.
21
In the full sample the breakdown of venture- and non-venture-backed IPOs by industry is: 55 VC, 43 NVC in SIC
283; 113 VC, 60 NVC in SIC 357; 35 VC, 42 NVC in SIC 366; 40 VC, 30 NVC in SIC 367; 31 VC, 39 NVC in SIC
382; 45 VC, 64 NVC in SIC 384; and 103 VC, 110 NVC in SIC 737.
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the IPO than the non-venture-backed firms. In addition, venture-backed firms are much more
R&D intensive, have a higher operating return on assets, and have a lower total debt to assets
ratio. While the primary interest is on the long-run performance and economic impact exhibited
by the full sample of firms, it is also interesting to consider how venture-backed firms perform
over time relative to a sample of non-venture-backed firms that are initially very similar.
Toward this end, a matched sample of venture- and non-venture-backed firms based on industry
and firm size is also constructed (similar to Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Jain and Kini
(1995)). Specifically, within each three-digit industry, a venture-backed firm is matched with the
non-venture-backed firm that has the closest level of total assets in the fiscal year prior to the
IPO, as long as the non-venture-backed firm has assets between 60% and 140% of the venturebacked firm‘s and has not already been used as a match. So as to impose the same data
requirements on all firms in the matched sample, there is no re-matching if a firm exits or is
dropped from coverage in Compustat. As discussed later, to the extent that this rule introduces a
bias it should work against the venture-backed firms.
While the matching algorithm is similar in spirit to Barber and Lyon (1996) and
Loughran and Ritter (1997), it is more restrictive. Matching is based only on firm size within a
narrow three-digit industry because the following analysis concerns post-IPO performance along
a number of different margins (e.g., survival, growth, operating performance, investment, and
economic impact.). Though matching is based on total assets, the firms in the matched sample
are also very similar in terms of sales, employees and physical capital. In addition, matching
greatly reduces the initial differences in IPO proceeds and operating performance. 22 In fact, the
median initial difference in return on assets between a venture-backed firm and its match is just
10%.
The strict matching criterion reduces the size of the sample considerably, to 183 of each
type of firm, because many venture-backed firms simply have no good non-venture-backed
match. Sample size is clearly being sacrificed for closeness of match – while the sample size
declines by almost 55%, the median percent difference between the initial size of the venturebacked firm and its match is less than four percent. In SIC 357 it is particularly difficult to find
matches for the venture-backed firms because they are so much larger than the non-venturebacked firms across the board. The venture- and non-venture-backed firms in SIC 737, on the
other hand, match up fairly well, and this industry accounts for over a third of the firms in the
matched sample.23
D. Firm Characteristic prior to the IPO
Table I contains a comprehensive set of the characteristics the firms in the two samples
exhibit the fiscal year prior to the IPO.24 As previously discussed, venture- and non-venture22

The venture-backed firms raised more funds than the non-venture-backed firms at both the mean ($21.06 vs.
$14.83) and median ($13.62 vs. $8.23), but these differences are very similar to those reported by Megginson and
Weiss (1991) and Jain and Kini (1995), even though they each matched by offer size when creating their samples.
Specifically, Megginson and Weiss report a median offer of $15.0 million for the venture-backed and $9.2 million
for the non-venture-backed firms in their sample, while Jain and Kini report a median offer of $14.80 million for the
venture-backed firms in their sample and $11.60 million for the non-venture-backed firms.
23
In the matched sample the number of venture- and non-venture-backed firms by industry is: 25 in SIC 283, 29 in
SIC 357, 13 in SIC 366, 14 in SIC 367, 18 in SIC 382, 20 in SIC 384, and 64 in SIC 737.
24
For the matched sample, if data is missing for a firm its match was also dropped from the values reported in the
table. Including all available data has very little impact on the values reported, and has no impact on the
significance tests.
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backed firms in the matched sample are generally very similar in terms of initial size. In fact,
none of the differences in initial size, at the mean or median, are statistically significant. There
are, however, some significant differences in investment spending for the venture- and nonventure-backed firms in the matched sample. The absolute level of spending on physical capital
is somewhat higher for the venture-backed firms at both the mean ($1.94 million vs. $1.38
million) and the median ($0.60 million vs. $0.46 million), though these differences are not
statistically significant. The ratio of capital expenditures to sales is slightly higher for the
venture-backed firms at the mean (0.46 vs. 0.32) and is significantly greater at the median (0.07
vs. 0.05). Differences in R&D spending are much more pronounced. The median level of
spending on R&D is around twice as large for the venture-backed firms ($1.00 million vs. $0.49
million), as is the median ratio of R&D to sales (0.11 vs. 0.06). These differences are
statistically (and economically) significant, as are the mean differences.
A key measure of operating performance is operating return on assets, which is computed
by dividing gross operating income before depreciation and amortization by the book value of
assets.25 In the matched sample, the venture-backed firms have a lower return on assets at both
the mean and median, though the difference is not statistically significant. Other measures of
operating performance (not reported), such as net profit margin and return on equity, are also
very similar for the venture- and non-venture-backed firms.26 There are significant differences
between the venture- and non-venture-backed firms in terms of capital structure prior to the IPO.
Namely, at the median, venture-backed firms have a significantly smaller level of total debt per
dollar of assets, where total debt is computed by adding long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities. Long-term debt per dollar of assets (not reported) is actually very similar across firm
type, suggesting that non-venture-backed firms are more reliant on short-term debt financing.
Finally, the last rows in Table I report firm age at the time of the IPO. 27 Venture-backed
firms are younger at both the mean and the median in both samples, which is consistent with
several other studies of venture financing (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991)). On the one hand
this indicates that venture-backing might enable firms to access public equity earlier than would
otherwise be possible (or feasible), but could also be a sign of grandstanding by the venture
capitalist. In either case, age at the IPO is likely to impact the results that follow, since age has
been found to be a key determinate of firm growth and survival (e.g., Evans (1987) and Hall
(1987)).

25

Since R&D is treated as an expense instead of an investment, it is not included in operating income. So, R&D is
added to operating income before depreciation and amortization to compute gross operating income. Similarly,
Carpenter and Petersen (2002b) create a ‗gross cash flow‘ measure by adding R&D to cash flow. See also
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Hall (1992).
26
Another way to measure operating performance is to scale operating cash flow (operating income minus capital
expenditures) by total assets. This measure is very similar to operating return on assets, so it is not reported. For
studies that employ one or both of these measures see, for example, Kaplan (1989), Jain and Kini (1994 and 1995)
and Mikkelson et al. (1997).
27
Most of the age data was graciously provided by Laura Field and Jay Ritter (see Field and Karpoff (2002) and
Loughran and Ritter (2004)), the rest was hand collected from various issues of Moody‘s. In the full sample, age
data is missing for 60 venture-backed and 129 non-venture-backed firms. In the matched sample age data is missing
45 venture-backed firms and 39 non-venture-backed firms. In the remainder of the paper age for the firms with
missing data is set to the median of all IPO firms in their industry.
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E. Venture Financing and Initial Firm Characteristics
In the years leading up to the IPO, the median venture-backed firm in the full sample
received $9.30 million from venture capitalists and the average venture investment was over $21
million. In the matched sample, the median investment was $6.78 million and the average
investment $13.13 million. While this funding was received over several years, the venture
investments are very large relative to the size of the firm, and are much larger than the amount of
total debt carried by either type of firm into the IPO, at both the mean and median.
Given that venture-backed firms have received equity financing from the venture
capitalist, and have access to similar quantities of long-term debt, it is perhaps not surprising that
they are in a better position than the non-venture-backed firms to make investments (in both
R&D and physical capital) prior to the IPO. The equity financing that venture-backed firms have
received may be particularly important for financing R&D; and, in fact, for the venture-backed
firms in the matched sample there is a strong, positive relationship between the total amount of
venture capital received and R&D investment in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Regressions
(not reported) that control for industry and IPO-year fixed effects, indicate that an additional $1
million in cumulative venture funding is associated with a $70,000 increase in R&D spending in
the year before the IPO. The non-venture-backed firms, on the other hand, rely more heavily on
short-term debt financing, which is not well suited to finance high-tech investment, particularly
R&D (see, e.g., Carpenter and Petersen (2002b), Hall (1992) and Brown and Petersen (2005)).
So, while the venture- and non-venture-backed firms have similar stocks of physical capital just
before the IPO, the venture-backed firms have likely accumulated a considerably larger stock of
knowledge capital.28
III.

The Initial Public Offering
The impact that an initial public offering has on the characteristics of the firm is
noteworthy. As Table I indicates, venture-backed firms, on average, have larger IPOs than firms
that received no venture capital. In the matched sample, the venture-backed firms also raise
more funds relative to their size in the year before the IPO, a difference that is significant at the
median (1.95 vs. 1.52) but not at the mean (2.89 vs. 2.44). 29 In the full sample, venture-backed
firms actually raise significantly less per dollar of assets than the non-venture-backed firms at
both the mean (2.29 vs. 4.11) and the median (1.34 vs. 1.92). The price of the issue is very
similar for the venture- and non-venture-backed firms in the matched sample, but significantly
larger for the venture-backed firms in the full sample.
Since cash is a component of total assets, there is a dramatic increase in firm asset size
that occurs at the time of the IPO. In fact, going public dramatically impacts almost every aspect
of the issuing firm. Table II reports mean and median percent changes in several key variables
from the year before (t = -1) to two years after (t = 2) the IPO. A Wilcoxon two-sample signedrank test is used to examine whether the median percent change is significantly different for the
venture- and non-venture-backed firms.
28

Monitoring by venture capitalists that keeps firms from ―window-dressing‖ their balance sheet just before the IPO
might also lead to more investment by venture-backed firms prior to the IPO. This is suggested by Jain and Kini
(1995).
29
In matched sample regressions (not reported) that control for industry, IPO-year, age, return on assets, and
leverage; at the sample mean, venture-backing is associated with a 19% increase in amount raised per dollar of total
assets. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002 and 2003) present similar results for European IPOs.
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Not surprisingly, the size variable impacted most by the IPO, at least at the median, is
total assets. For the matched sample, the median increase in total assets from the year before the
IPO to two years after is around 225% for the venture-backed firms and 175% for the nonventure-backed firms. Sales, as well as employees (not reported) and the stock of physical
capital (not reported), also increased substantially. For all size measures the venture-backed
firms exhibited greater growth through the IPO, though only for sales was the difference in
growth statistically significant at conventional levels. Results from the full sample were very
similar.
The IPO also has a significant impact on capital expenditures and R&D for both ventureand non-venture-backed firms. In the matched sample, the median venture-backed firm
increases capital expenditures by over 100%, and increases spending on R&D by over 140%.
The non-venture-backed firms increase both capital expenditures (80%) and R&D (120%) by a
slightly smaller amount, but the difference is not statistically significant. The average change in
both capital expenditures and R&D, however, is much larger for the non-venture-backed firms
(though again the differences are not statistically significant).
Relative to sales, the non-venture backed firms have significantly larger increases in both
capital expenditures and R&D. While the median venture-backed firm has a 16% decline in the
capital spending to sales ratio, the median non-venture-backed firm increases capital
expenditures to sales by 5%. Similarly, R&D to sales increases by just 2% for the median
venture-backed firm but 29% for the median non-venture-backed firm. Findings for the full
sample are similar, though there is a great deal of variation and the differences are not
statistically significant.
Overall, the results suggest that, in terms of financing physical investment and R&D, the
IPO is particularly important to the non-venture-backed firms. The median non-venture-backed
firm significantly increases their R&D and capital spending intensity, and the mean change in the
level of investment in both physical capital and R&D is dramatic (well over 500% in each case).
It is noteworthy that the changes around the IPO are much more subdued for the venture-backed
firms; though recall from Table I that the venture-backed firms have much higher investment
levels before the IPO, especially with regard to R&D. As this highlights, venture financing may
be particularly valuable because the early access to external equity finance means that venturebacked firms do not have to wait for the IPO to invest in R&D. The ability to make key
investments in the pre-IPO period will undoubtedly impact firm performance over time, and may
give the venture-backed firms a significant advantage over their non-venture-backed
counterparts.
IV.

Survival
A. Cumulative Exit Rates
Remaining in business as an independent economic agent (i.e., surviving) is probably the
most basic way to gauge firm performance over time. As Klepper (2002, p. 37) notes, ―[length
of survival] appears to be closely related to other measures of performance such as profitability,
size, and growth, and arguably it is the most comprehensive of the group.‖ In Panel A of Table
III, cumulative exit rates, together with the share of exits caused by a merger or acquisition, are
reported at five and ten years after the IPO. In the matched sample, exit rates are generally very
similar for the venture- and non-venture-backed firms, though a slightly larger share of the nonventure-backed firms exit in the first ten years following the IPO (by t = 10). Five years after the
IPO 24.6% of the venture-backed firms, and 23.5% of the non-venture-backed firms, have
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exited. By t = 10 almost half of the original sample is gone (48.8% of the venture-backed firms
and 51.2% of the non-venture-backed firms). In the full sample, non-venture-backed firms have
a much higher exit rate, which is perhaps not surprising given their much smaller size initially.
Differences between the venture- and non-venture-backed firms with regard to the type of
exit are pronounced in each sample. While the most common reason for exit is a merger or
acquisition for each type of firm, by t = 10 a larger share of the venture-backed firms (62%) in
the matched sample exit in this manner than do the non-venture-backed firms (54%). In the full
sample, a much larger share of the venture-backed firms exit due to a merger or acquisition.
B. Proportional Hazard Estimates
To more systematically examine survival after the IPO, consider a proportional hazard
model of the form
h(t) = h0(t) exp{’X}.

(1)

The Cox proportional hazard model is a popular way to model duration because it imposes no
structure on the baseline hazard h0(t), it easily handles censored observations, and the
interpretation is straightforward. The ability to deal with censored observations is important,
because many firms have not exited by the end of the sample period. In addition, a merger is an
ambiguous type of exit, so it makes sense to treat mergers as censored observations instead of
outright failures. In each case the model accounts for the fact that the firm survived until the end
of the sample, or until the merger.30
Panel B of Table III contains the results from Cox regressions using both the full and
matched samples. In each case the dependent variable is the number of years the firm survived
after the IPO (Time-To-Exit). The independent variables are the log of total assets the year
before the IPO, the log of firm age at the IPO, and a dummy variable (VC) equaling one if the
firm was venture financed and zero otherwise. Several studies have found size and age to be
important determinates of firm survival, most concluding that, all else equal, firms that are larger
and older survive longer (Sutton (1997)). Industry and IPO-year dummies are also included in
the regressions, but not reported with the results.
For each sample the coefficient on the VC dummy is negative and statistically significant.
The negative coefficient indicates that after controlling for initial size and age venture-backed
firms have a lower hazard rate than non-venture-backed firms, and hence a longer expected
duration. The risk ratio says that, relative to non-venture-backed firms, venture-backed firms in
the full sample are just 0.56 times as likely to exit in any given period (0.61 times as likely in the
matched sample).31 Not surprisingly, the results also suggest firms that are larger and older at the
time of the IPO tend to survive longer.
C. Implications of the Exit Statistics
Recall that firms are not replaced in the matched sample once they exit Compustat
coverage. Thus, the exit statistics have some important implications for the results that follow.
30

See Kiefer (1988) for more information on hazard models in general, and the Cox proportional model in
particular.
31
It is important to note that the inferences one draws from these coefficient estimates will be misleading if the
model is misspecified and/or important explanatory variables are omitted. See Kiefer (1988, pp. 671-676), Kiefer
and Skoog (1984), Lancaster (1990), and Ridder and Verbakel (1984).
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The fact that overall exit rates are so similar in the matched sample greatly mitigates any bias
that exit introduces as performance is examined over time. Observed growth rates, for example,
will be overstated because of exit, but should be similarly overstated for both venture- and nonventure-backed firms. In fact, because the sample of non-venture-backed firms sheds a slightly
larger share of underperformers by the end of the sample period (this is especially true in the full
sample), any bias that is introduced should actually work against the venture-backed firms.
Additionally, if firms that are merged or acquired have a greater sustained impact on economic
output than firms that went bankrupt or were liquidated, the true performance of venture-backed
firms relative to non-venture-backed firms will be understated.
V.

Performance and Financing after the IPO
This section considers whether persistent empirical differences in the performance and
financing of venture- and non-venture-backed firms exist in the decade following the IPO. This
is done using a battery of descriptive regressions, reported in Tables IV – VI. Since the interest
is on the post-IPO period, the first observation taken for each firm occurs at t = 2, and the last
observation is taken at t = 10. Starting with t = 2 allows the first growth rates to be computed
from t = 1, the first fiscal year following the IPO. All of the firms are included until they exit or
are no longer covered by Compustat, and the bias this introduces, as just discussed, should work
against the venture-backed firms. Once again, separate results are reported for the full and
matched samples.
A. Firm Growth after the IPO
Sales and total assets are used to evaluate the relative growth of venture-backed firms
after the IPO, though the results for employment growth are very similar. Sales growth is also
commonly used to gauge the operating performance of the firm (e.g., Gompers et al. (2003)).
The growth regressions take the following form:
Gi,t = 0 +1VCi + t + 3VCi*t
(2)

4ln(BMi,t-1) + 5ln(Age i,t=0) + 6Industryi + 7IPO-Yeari +i,t.

Since t is the number of years since the IPO, Gi,t is the growth rate of firm i at time t, and is equal
to the log change over the previous year. A dummy variable, VC, is equal to one if the firm was
venture-backed and zero otherwise, and an interaction between the VC dummy and the number
of years since the IPO is included to examine whether the relative growth rates across ventureand non-venture-backed firms change over time. The only additional controls, which include the
book-to-market ratio at the end of the prior fiscal year and the age of the firm at the IPO, are
similar to those used by Gompers et al. (2003). A set of dummy variables is included to control
for industry and IPO-year effects, though estimates on the dummies are not reported in the
output. Additionally, to ensure the results are not being driven by outliers, the 1% tails of all
regression variables are excluded.32
The evidence, reported in the first four columns of Table IV, suggests that venturebacked firms grow significantly faster than non-venture-backed firms, and that this superior
performance persists for several years following the IPO. For both the full and matched samples,
the estimated coefficient on the VC dummy in each growth regression is positive, statistically
32

The coefficient estimates are not as precise, but the results are generally the same if all firms and all observations
are included.
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significant and large. The coefficient on the interaction between venture backing and time is
negative and (generally) significant, indicating that there is some convergence (at around one
percentage point a year) in growth rates over time. For example, the regression estimates from
the matched sample suggest that annual sales growth two years after the IPO is 5.7 percentage
points greater for the venture-backed firms, while asset growth is 4.2 percentage points greater.
The regression results suggest that venture-backed firms in the matched sample continue to
experience faster sales growth for six to seven years after the IPO, and faster asset growth for
more than five years. The results for the full sample are very similar, though asset growth is
initially much faster for the venture-backed firms, and therefore convergence takes much longer
(almost ten years). The fact that venture-backed firms in the full sample exhibit significantly
faster growth is particularly impressive given that they are initially much larger and have lower
exit rates than the non-venture-backed firms.
B. R&D, Knowledge Capital and Capital Expenditures
The last four columns of Table IV examine R&D investment in the years following the
IPO. In addition to the rate of growth, the (log) level of R&D to sales in the post-IPO period is
also examined. The regression specifications are exactly the same as above. Columns (5) and
(6) indicate that growth in R&D investment is much faster for the venture-backed firms for many
years following the IPO. In the matched sample, two years after the IPO the annual growth in
spending on R&D is almost 12 percentage points greater for venture-backed firms. As with
growth in sales and assets there is some evidence of convergence, but convergence in R&D
growth rates take even longer. The estimates from the matched sample imply that venturebacked firms have faster R&D growth for over eight years following the IPO, and in the full
sample venture-backed firms have faster R&D growth for more than a decade.
Since venture-backed firms have higher levels of R&D prior to the IPO, and much faster
rates of growth in R&D spending after the IPO, they should accumulate a significantly larger
stock of ―knowledge‖ capital over time. Following Hall (1990), a stock of knowledge capital
can be created for each firm, based on the firm‘s historical spending on R&D. Hall assumes that
knowledge depreciates at a rate of 15% per year, and that the initial stock of knowledge is equal
to the initial level of R&D divided by the sum of the depreciation rate (0.15) and the R&D
growth rate (0.08). The stock of knowledge at any given t is then
Kt = 0.85*Kt-1 + R&Dt.33

(3)

Looking ten years after the IPO, venture-backed firms have accumulated a stock of knowledge
over three times larger (at both the mean and median) in the matched sample, and over five times
larger in the full sample.
There is also evidence (not reported) that growth in capital expenditures is significantly
faster for the venture-backed firms over the post-IPO period, though only for the full sample are
the results statistically significant. For the full sample annual growth in capital spending is more
that 15 percentage points greater for venture-backed firms two years after the IPO, and it takes
more than eight years for growth rates to converge. In the matched sample the coefficient on the

33

Occasionally, in the time series for a given firm, one or two observations on R&D were missing. In those cases
R&D in the previous period is used when computing knowledge capital.
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venture capital dummy is positive and in line with the estimate from the full sample, but it just
misses significance at the 10% level.
Columns (7) and (8) in Table IV indicate that venture-backed firms continue to have a
significantly greater R&D to sales ratio in the post-IPO period, and there is no evidence of
convergence over time. For the matched sample, the R&D to sales ratio is, on average, almost
60% larger for venture-backed firms. Similarly, in the full sample the venture-backed firms have
an R&D to sales ratio approximately 38% larger. The results for capital expenditures to sales are
similar, though the differences are less pronounced, especially in the matched sample: on
average, capital spending to sales is 33% greater for venture-backed firms in the full sample and
18% greater for venture-backed firms in the matched sample. There is no evidence in either
sample that the higher level of capital spending to sales for venture-backed firms disappears over
time. So, while non-venture-backed firms have significantly larger increases in both R&D to
sales and capital expenditures to sales around the time of the IPO, they never reach the
investment intensity of venture-backed firms in the post-IPO period, and in fact may fall further
behind.34
C. Tobin‘s Q and Operating Performance
This section examines whether any empirical relationships exist between venture-backing
and firm value and operating performance in the post-IPO period, where firm value is measured
by Tobin‘s Q. Like Gompers et al. (2003), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Q is computed by
dividing the market value of assets (book value of assets + market value of common stock –
book value of common stock – deferred taxes) by the book value of assets. Common measures
of operating performance are also examined, once again closely following Gompers et al. (2003).
The regression specifications are the same as above, though in the Q regression the book-tomarket ratio is replaced by the log of assets at the beginning of the current fiscal year. The
results are reported in Table V.
Columns (1) and (2) contain estimates for the full and matched samples when the log of
Q is the dependent variable. In the matched sample, Q is approximately 15% greater for the
venture-backed firms, on average, during the decade following the IPO. The coefficient on the
interaction between venture backing and time suggests no convergence over time. However,
there is no evidence of a higher Q value for the venture-backed firms in the full sample, as the
coefficient on the venture capital dummy is slightly negative and statistically insignificant.
The evidence regarding operating performance after the IPO appears in columns (3) – (8).
While the coefficient estimates on the venture capital dummy are typically positive, only for
return on assets (gross operating income divided by total assets) are the differences between
venture- and non-venture-backed firms statistically significant in both the full and matched
samples. Net profit margin (gross operating income divided by sales) is significantly greater for
the venture-backed firms in the full sample, but not in the matched sample. In the return on
equity (gross operating income divided by the book value of equity) regressions the coefficient
on the venture capital dummy is positive but insignificant in the full sample, and slightly
negative and insignificant in the matched sample. The interaction between venture backing and
time is negative in the net profit margin and return on assets regressions, and positive in the
34

The findings on R&D suggest that venture-backed firms are likely driving innovation as well. Though R&D is an
input, it is often used as a proxy for innovative activity (see Griliches (1990)). For more on the relationship between
venture capital and innovation, see Kortum and Lerner (2000).
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return on equity regressions, but not statistically significant in any case. Overall then, there is
some evidence that venture-backed firms have superior operating performance in the post-IPO
period, at least when measured by sales growth, return on assets and (to a lesser extent) net profit
margin, and no evidence that the operating performance of venture-backed firms is inferior.
D. Debt and Equity
Table VI examines the book value of equity and debt, as well as the use of new long-term
debt and equity in the post-IPO period. Pooled regressions on stockholder equity over assets,
long-term debt over assets and total debt over assets in the post-IPO period are reported in
columns (1) – (6), and have the same general specification used throughout this section. The
results are very similar to those for the pre-IPO period: the book value of stockholder equity to
total assets is significantly larger for venture-backed firms, while long-term debt to total assets is
slightly smaller, and total debt to total assets is significantly smaller. There is some evidence
that the relative level of stockholder equity to assets diminishes over time for the venture-backed
firms, but the coefficient estimates on the interaction term are small.
The remainder of Table VI contains output from cross-sectional regressions examining
whether venture- and non-venture-backed firms differ in the amount of follow-up equity and new
long-term debt that is issued after the IPO. In columns (7) and (8) the dependent variable is the
log of cumulative net equity issued between t = 2 and t = 10, while in columns (9) and (10) the
dependent variable is the log of cumulative new long-term debt. Controls in the cross section
regressions include age, book-to-market and asset size at the end of the IPO year, as well as
industry and IPO-year dummies. The findings indicate that venture-backed firms raise
significantly more net new equity relative to non-venture-backed firms. For example, in the
matched sample venture-backing is associated with a 68% increase in the cumulative amount of
new equity raised. As for new long-term debt, the coefficient on the venture capital dummy is
small and statistically insignificant in each sample, suggesting little difference between ventureand non-venture-backed firms.
VI.

Impact on the High-Tech Sector
To get a sense of the relative impact that venture- and non-venture-backed IPOs from the
1980s have had on economic output in the U.S., the aggregate contribution that each group made
to high-tech sales, R&D and market value between 1990 and 2003 is reported in Table VII.
High-tech output is computed by summing across all of the publicly traded firms covered by
Compustat in the seven industries from which the samples are drawn. The venture-backed firms
have a much larger impact on the high-tech sector, and their influence is expanding over time,
while the non-venture-backed firms have become relatively less important. These figures
capture the cumulative impact that venture-backed firms have because of longer survival, faster
growth and the presence of some very successful firms.
Looking first at the matched sample, the venture-backed firms account for around 3% of
high-tech sales in 1990, but almost 6% by 2003. The non-venture-backed firms, on the other
hand, account for 1.6% of sales in 1990 but just 0.7% by 2003. Similarly, the share of high-tech
R&D attributable to the venture-backed firms increased from 5% in 1990 to 6.7% in 2003; but
the share of R&D that the non-venture-backed firms were responsible for declined from just over
1% in 1990 to 0.4% in 2003. Even more dramatic is the share of high-tech market value, which
increases from 5.5% to 10.2% between 1990 and 2003 for the venture-backed firms, but during
this same time declines from 1.6% to 0.5% for the non-venture-backed firms. The fact that the
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venture-backed firms in the matched sample actually increase the share of high-tech output they
account for is particularly impressive since the number of firms in the matched sample is
relatively small and declining throughout the 1990s, while the number of firms in the high-tech
sector is expanding dramatically. By 2003 the venture-backed IPOs had cumulative sales over
eight times larger than the non-venture-backed firms, cumulative R&D 15 times larger, and
cumulative market value 22 times larger. The results for the full sample, while less surprising,
are impressive nonetheless. Venture-backed IPOs accounted for 16% of sales, 15% of R&D, and
20% of high-tech market value in 2003. The corresponding values for the non-venture-backed
firms were 1%, 0.8%, and 0.7%.
As the results suggest, almost all of the big winners from the set of firms that went public
in the 1980s were financed with venture capital. If the firms in the matched sample are ranked
based on sales in 2003, there are no non-venture-backed firms in the top five and only six nonventure-backed firms in the top 20. Looking across the seven high-tech industries, 13 firms in
the full sample of IPOs from the 1980s are among the top ten firms in their industry (in terms of
net sales) at the end of 2003; and of these 13 firms, all but one received venture capital financing.
VII.

Conclusions
In the U.S., venture capital has emerged as an important source of external finance for
many private, high-tech firms. Venture capitalists become actively involved with the firms they
finance and are in a unique position to have a major impact on the long-run performance of the
firm. Most of the prior research on venture capital financing has focused on the time leading up
to and surrounding the firm‘s IPO. While this focus is understandable, the true importance of
venture capital finance surely depends, as well, on how venture-backed firms perform in the
years following their IPO.
To examine the relative performance of venture-backed firms over the long-run, this
study focuses on U.S. firms that went public during the 1980s in seven key high-tech industries.
The relative performance of venture-backed firms is examined with a full sample comprised of
all IPOs from the decade, as well as a carefully matched sample based on industry and firm size
prior to the IPO. The results indicate that venture-backed firms raise considerably more funds
from the IPO, and that both types of firms exhibit significant increases in their size and
investment spending as they move through the IPO. The IPO appears to be especially important
for non-venture-backed firms in terms of financing capital spending and R&D. Following the
IPO, venture-backed firms survive longer and have lower hazard rates. Estimates from a series
of growth regressions indicate that venture-backed firms grow much faster than non-venturebacked firms for many years after the IPO, though growth rates do (slowly) converge over time.
On average, in the matched and un-matched samples, venture-backed firms also have much
faster growth in R&D spending in the post-IPO period, are much more R&D intensive, and
accumulate a much larger stock of knowledge capital. In addition, the operating performance of
venture-backed firms is generally superior in the post-IPO period, but the extent of this superior
performance depends on the measure of operating performance employed. Venture-backed firms
have a higher level of stockholder equity to total assets in the decade following the IPO, and they
raise significantly more new equity during this period. Finally, by 2003 the venture-backed
firms that went public in the 1980s had a far greater cumulative impact on sales, R&D and
market capitalization in the high-tech sector.
These findings raise interesting questions about the role the venture capitalist plays in
firm performance over the long-run. The superior long-run performance that venture-backed
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firms exhibit is probably due to several factors: venture capitalists select the most promising
ideas, they ensure adequate external financing, and they provide valuable support and
governance. At a minimum, the results suggest that in the 1980s venture capitalists, on average,
were doing a good job of providing resources to firms with promising long-run prospects. It is
possible that some of these firms had sufficient access to other sources of early-stage, external
finance and would have become just as successful without venture financing. For these firms,
the contribution that venture capitalists make may be limited, but venture capitalists certainly do
not appear to harm long-run performance. In fact, venture financing probably allows firms to go
public sooner, and therefore helps, at least, to speed up the development of successful firms.
Given the problems associated with financing high-tech investment, the venture
capitalist‘s contribution is likely much more crucial. Many of the firms that venture capitalists
finance probably do not have sufficient access to other sources of external finance. The fact that
entrepreneurs are willing to give so much ownership and control to the venture capitalist
suggests that alternative financing sources are limited at best. It is not unreasonable to expect
that many good projects may have been under funded, or not funded at all, without the private
equity financing that venture capitalists provide. The findings show that venture-backed firms
do engage in significantly more R&D before the IPO, and the fact that non-venture-backed firms
exhibit a dramatic increase in R&D intensity as they move through the IPO suggests that their
ability to finance investment was constrained beforehand. This constraint could have been a
serious competitive disadvantage for the non-venture-backed firms because the R&D
investments that venture-backed firms were able to make allowed them to acquire greater
intellectual capital in the pre-IPO period, which would positively impact their performance after
the IPO.
Besides relaxing financing constraints, there are other ways that venture capitalists add
value to the firms they finance. The guidance, networking and experience that venture capitalists
provide might very well contribute to the superior long-run performance that venture-backed
firms exhibit. The extent to which this ‗value-added‘ role impacts long-run performance is
unclear, but the findings presented in this paper suggest that future research into the relative
importance that various aspects of venture capitalist involvement have on long-run performance
would be fruitful.
This paper highlights several other issues that warrant further study. In particular, the
evidence presented here shows that venture-backed firms have been the driving force behind
high-tech production in the U.S. These findings suggest that the availability of early stage
venture financing may play a key role in determining whether a country or region is able to
specialize in the production of high-tech goods, but more international evidence on venture
capital financing and high-tech production is clearly needed. Additionally, the initial evidence
that venture-backed firms in Europe do not significantly outperform in the years immediately
following the IPO indicates that the nature of venture financing can differ considerably in
different economies (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002, 2003)). Documenting these differences, and
understanding the implications they have for firm performance over time, would be especially
valuable.
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Table I
Characteristics of IPO Firms
This table presents key firm characteristics the fiscal year before the IPO for a full and matched sample of venture- and non-venture-backed firms that went
public between 1980 and 1989 in the U.S. high-tech sector. The data comes from Compustat, and all reported values are in millions of 2000 dollars. Return on
assets is equal to gross operating income (operating income plus R&D) divided by total assets. Total debt is equal to long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities. Means are reported first, medians are in bold, and the number of observations is in italics. If a firm in the matched sample had missing data its match
was also excluded from the values reported in the last three columns of the table. Including all possible observations has no significant impact. Tests of
differences in medians are based on the Wilcoxon two-sample signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Full Sample
Total Assets

IPO Proceeds

Sales

Capital Spending

Capital Spending / Sales

R&D

R&D / Sales

Matched Sample

VC

NVC

t, z stat

VC

NVC

t, z stat

23.53

15.41

2.41**

14.38

14.28

0.04

14.92

3.46

10.37***

7.34

6.85

0.59

346

287

183

183

26.65

11.79

8.32***

21.06

14.82

2.65***

19.15

6.33

12.46***

13.62

8.22

3.08***

415

376

183

183

29.02

18.52

3.00***

18.06

19.95

-0.06

17.32

5.62

7.57***

8.21

9.89

-1.26

346

283

169

169

3.24

1.15

5.32***

1.94

1.38

1.39

1.24

0.26

10.04***

0.60

0.46

1.63

343

280

164

164

0.40

0.42

-0.13

0.46

0.32

0.58

0.07

0.06

3.74***

0.07

0.05

3.93***

334

266

153

153

3.45

1.14

7.79***

2.14

1.25

2.29**

2.01

0.43

11.58***

1.00

0.49

4.52***

324

237

126

126

0.84

0.74

1.37

0.23

0.31

2.13**
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Table I, continued
Characteristics of IPO Firms

Return on Assets

Total Debt / Total Assets

Firm Age

0.11

0.08

315

226

0.21

0.10

0.27

0.23

324

235

0.26

0.44

0.16

0.30

346

287

7.13

8.8

5

6

362

259

3.59***

0.11

0.06

5.10***

119

119

2.81***

-0.16

0.24

-1.61

1.62

0.25

0.29

-1.08

168

168

-3.93***

0.32

0.34

-0.69

-5.44***

0.17

0.27

-2.53**

171

171

-2.47**

8

10

-1.94*

-1.12

6

8

-1.78*

138

144
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Table II
Percent Changes in Firm Characteristics around the IPO (t = -1 to t = 2)
Table values are the percentage change from the year before the IPO (t = -1) to two years after the IPO (t = 2) for venture- and nonventure-backed firms that went public between 1980 and 1989 in the U.S. high-tech sector. The mean percent change is reported first,
the median percent change is in bold, and the number of observations is in italics. For the matched sample, if a firm had missing data in t
= -1 then its match was also excluded from the calculations. The number of observations differs across firm type in the matched sample
because some firms have already exited and others have missing data in t = 2. Tests of differences in medians across the two groups are
based on the Wilcoxon two-sample signed-rank test. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Total Assets

Sales

Capital Spending

Capital Spending / Sales

R&D

R & D / Sales

VC
373%
200%
313
632%
132%
307
358%
113%
307
67%
-14%
300
292%
146%
289
52%
2%
281

Full Sample
NVC
470%
183%
239
398%
77%
228
564%
91%
227
155%
-8%
220
385%
115%
192
335%
5%
183

t, z stat
-1.13
0.64
0.99
3.39***
-1.54
0.37
-2.04**
-1.31
-0.97
2.22**
-1.48
-0.50

VC
344%
225%
162
782%
118%
144
319%
101%
145
49%
-16%
136
321%
143%
110
59%
2%
103

Matched Sample
NVC
293%
175%
161
217%
64%
146
583%
80%
141
182%
5%
132
543%
123%
106
604%
29%
98

t, z stat
1.16
1.29
1.45
3.37***
-1.41
0.03
-2.36**
-2.20**
-1.26
0.79
-1.53
-2.13**
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Table III
Cumulative Exit Rates and Proportional Hazard Estimates
This table presents cumulative exit rates and hazard estimates for the venture- and non-venturebacked firms that went public between 1980 and 1989 in the U.S. high-tech sector. The
cumulative exit rate, reported in Panel A, is the percentage of firms initially in the sample that
are no longer covered by Compustat. The share of exits due to merger or acquisition is based
on information reported by Compustat. Panel B reports estimates from Cox proportional
hazard regressions where the dependent variable is the number of years the firm survived after
the IPO (time-to-exit). VC is a dummy variable indicating venture-backing, Size is a control
for firm assets at the time of the IPO, and Age is firm age (in years) at the time of the IPO.
Industry and IPO year dummies are also included. Firms that survive until the end of the
sample period, as well as firms that are merged or acquired are treated as right-censored
observations. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Full Sample
Panel A: Exit Rates
VC
NVC
Cumulative Exit Rate to t = 5
17.5%
29.1%
Share Merger or Acquisition
64.9%
55.4%
Cumulative Exit Rate to t = 10
39.8%
49.2%
Share Merger or Acquisition
63.1%
38.7%

Matched Sample
VC
24.6%
55.6%
48.8%
62.2%

NVC
23.5%
53.5%
51.2%
53.5%

Panel B: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates
Dependent Variable
Time-To-Exit
Independent Variables
Coefficient Risk Ratio Coefficient Risk Ratio
VC
-0.586
0.557
-0.491
0.612
(0.161)***
(0.236)**
ln(Sizet=-1)
-0.313
0.731
-0.621
0.537
(0.071)***
(0.142)***
ln(Aget=0)
-0.264
0.768
-0.194
0.823
(0.111)**
(0.183)
Industry Effects Included
IPO Yr. Effects Included
x2
model p-value

84.12
0.000

43.04
0.001
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Table IV
Firm Growth and R&D Investment after the IPO
This table presents regression results for sales growth, asset growth, growth in R&D spending and (log) R&D to sales between between
years t = 2 and t = 10 following the IPO. Growth rates are measured as the annual log change from the previous year. The controls
include a dummy variable equal to one if the firm received venture capital financing (VC), the number of years since the firm went public
(t), an interaction between venture-backing and years since the IPO (VC*t), the book-to-market ratio at the end of the previous fiscal year
(BM), and the age of the firm at the time of the IPO (Age). Controls for three-digit industry and IPO year are also included in the
regression but omitted from the table. Book-to-market is measured as the book value of common equity (book value of common equity +
deferred taxes) divided by the market value of common equity. The coefficients are in bold and robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. Significance at the ten-, five- and one-percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***. Results are reported separately for the full
and matched samples of high-tech IPOs (described in Section II).
Dependent Variable
Sample
Mean Difference (VC - NVC)
t-stat
Median Difference (VC - NVC)
z-stat
Independent Variables
VC
t
VC*t
ln(BMt-1)
ln(Aget=0)

(1)
(2)
Sales Growth
Full
Matched
0.042
0.044
3.58*** 2.87***
0.052
0.053
4.90*** 3.79***

(3)
(4)
Asset Growth
Full
Matched
0.045
0.036
4.32*** 2.60***
0.042
0.042
4.84*** 2.99***

0.077
0.081
0.109
(0.030)** (0.041)** (0.026)***
-0.010
-0.005
0.006
(0.004)*** (0.004)
(0.003)*
-0.006
-0.012
-0.011
(0.005) (0.006)* (0.004)***

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
R&D Growth
ln(R&D / Sales)
Full
Matched
Full
Matched
0.069
0.074
0.385
0.617
4.99*** 3.73*** 10.45*** 11.88***
0.056
0.055
0.328
0.442
5.30*** 3.81*** 11.24*** 11.82***

0.066
0.172
0.156
0.378
0.587
(0.034)** (0.035)*** (0.049)*** (0.084)*** (0.118)***
0.007
0.007
0.003
-0.007
-0.011
(0.003)** (0.005)
(0.006)
(0.012)
(0.015)
-0.012
-0.017
-0.019
0.009
0.007
(0.005)** (0.006)*** (0.008)** (0.014)
(0.019)

-0.089
-0.085
-0.103
-0.131
-0.077
-0.084
-0.177
-0.047
(0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.015)*** (0.023)*** (0.033)
-0.023
-0.001
0.008
0.001
0.002
0.011
-0.202
-0.137
(0.008)*** (0.012)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.016) (0.026)*** (0.036)***
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Table IV, continued
Firm Growth and R&D Investment after the IPO

Constant

Industry Effects Included
IPO-Year Effects Included
Adjusted R2
F-Stat
N

0.160
0.047
(0.045)*** (0.085)

0.07
11.22
4047

0.06
4.41
1920

-0.106
-0.294
-0.126
(0.042)*** (0.067)*** (0.055)**

0.07
13.40
4132

0.12
10.92
1968

0.04
7.60
3712

-0.123
(0.084)

0.03
3.67
1764

-1.125
-1.420
(0.132)*** (0.218)***

0.28
54.11
3711

0.26
23.21
1757
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Table V
Tobin's Q and Operating Performance
This table presents regression results for Tobin's Q, net profit margin, return on equity and return on assets between years t = 2 and t =
10 following the IPO. Tobin's Q is computed by dividing the market value of assets (book value of assets + market value of common
stock - book value of common stock - deferred taxes) by the book value of assets. Net profit margin is equal to gross operating income
(operating income + R&D) divided by net sales. Return on equity is equal to gross operating income divided by the book value of
stockholder equity, and return on assets is equal to gross operating income divided by the book value of assets. The controls include a
dummy variable equal to one if the firm received venture capital financing (VC), the number of years since the firm went public (t), an
interaction between venture-backing and years since the IPO (VC*t), the book-to-market ratio at the end of the previous fiscal year
(BM), and the age of the firm at the time of the IPO (Age). Controls for three-digit industry and IPO year are also included in the
regression but omitted from the table. Book-to-market is measured as the book value of common equity (book value of common equity
+ deferred taxes) divided by the market value of common equity. In the Q regression the book value of assets at the start of the current
fiscal year replaces the book-to-market ratio. The coefficients are in bold and robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Significance at the ten-, five- and one-percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***. Results are reported separately for the full and
matched samples of high-tech IPOs (described in Section II).
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)
Net Profit Margin

Full
-0.015
-0.75
0.042
0.87

Matched
0.175
6.13***
0.224
6.70***

Full
Matched
0.131
0.013
6.32***
0.47
0.060
0.037
11.91*** 5.68***

-0.022
(0.046)
-0.017
(0.006)***
0.016
(0.008)**

0.149
(0.062)**
-0.006
(0.007)
0.002
(0.010)

0.135
0.052
0.065
-0.004
0.087
0.059
(0.061)** (0.080)
(0.065)
(0.067) (0.025)*** (0.031)**
0.013
0.021
0.018
0.019
0.011
0.014
(0.008) (0.006)*** (0.008)** (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
-0.005
-0.017
0.001
0.001
-0.003
-0.007
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.004)
(0.004)

Dependent Variable
Sample
Mean Difference (VC - NVC)
t-stat
Median Difference (VC - NVC)
z-stat
Independent Variable
VC
t
VC*t

ln(Q)

(5)
(6)
Return on Equity

(7)
(8)
Return on Assets

Full
Matched
Full
Matched
0.072
0.008
0.091
0.035
3.20***
0.29
10.45*** 3.25***
0.056
0.007
0.052
0.021
5.91***
0.96
10.21*** 3.71***
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Table V, continued
Tobin's Q and Operating Performance

ln(BMt-1)
ln(Aget=0)
ln(Sizet-1)
Constant

-0.151
(0.014)***
-0.064
(0.008)***
1.870
(0.080)***

0.027
-0.050
-0.051
-0.101
-0.009
-0.041
(0.018) (0.021)** (0.018)***(0.023)*** (0.006) (0.008)***
-0.110
0.043
0.043
0.019
0.043
0.020
0.027
(0.022)*** (0.015)***(0.015)*** -(0.017) (0.016)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)***
-0.056
(0.013)***
1.879
-0.351
-0.695
-0.220
-0.380
-0.079
-0.224
(0.112)*** (0.086)*** (0.279)** (0.082)***(0.104)*** (0.033)** (0.048)***

Industry Effects Included
IPO-Year Effects Included
Adjusted R2
F-Stat
N

0.17
33.41
4062

0.17
19.08
2034

0.07
7.53
3167

0.09
5.72
1501

0.05
11.11
3185

0.14
9.29
1518

0.11
18.57
3225

0.16
12.80
1539
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Table VI
Debt and Equity
Columns one through six present regression results for the book value of stockholder equity over assets, long-term debt over assets, and total debt
over assets between years t = 2 and t = 10 following the IPO. Total debt is measured as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. The controls
include a dummy variable equal to one if the firm received venture capital financing (VC), the number of years since the firm went public (t), an
interaction between venture-backing and years since the IPO (VC*t), the book-to-market ratio at the end of the previous fiscal year (BM), and the age
of the firm at the time of the IPO (Age). Controls for three-digit industry and IPO year are also included in the regressions but omitted from the table.
Book-to-market is measured as the book value of common equity (book value of common equity + deferred taxes) divided by the market value of
common equity. In columns seven through ten the dependent variables are the log of cumulative new equity issued and the log of cumulative new
long-term debt issued between years t = 2 and t = 10. For these regressions the log of assets at t = 0 is included as an additional control. The
coefficients are reported in bold and robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance at the ten-, five- and one-percent level is
indicated by *, **, and ***. Results are reported separately for the full and matched samples of high-tech IPOs (described in Section II).

Dependent Variable
Sample
Mean Difference
(VC - NVC)
t-stat
Median Difference
(VC - NVC)
z-stat
Independent Variable
VC
t
VC*t
ln(BMt-1)

(1)
(2)
Equity / Assets

(3)
(4)
LT Debt / Assets

Full

Matched

Full

Matched

0.073
5.95***

0.047
2.66***

-0.012
-2.60***

-0.015
-2.58**

0.060
6.00***

0.063
4.63***

-0.002
-0.011
-0.69 -2.71***

0.108
0.136
(0.026)*** (0.033)***
0.002
0.004
(0.003)
(0.004)
-0.009
-0.014
(0.004)** (0.005)***

-0.007
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)

0.032
-0.005
(0.006)*** (0.009)

-0.005
(0.003)

(5)
(6)
Total Debt / Assets

(7)
(8)
ln(New Equity)

(9)
(10)
ln(New LT Debt)

Full

Matched

Full

Matched

-0.050
-0.036
-6.76*** -3.55***

1.225
6.54***

1.041
3.86***

1.147
5.16***

0.443
1.47

-0.043
-0.044
-5.29*** -4.02***

1.715
6.75***

1.663
4.12***

1.018
5.01***

0.375
1.53

0.054
(0.215)
-

-0.042
(0.280)
-

-

-

Full

Matched

-0.037
-0.053
-0.083
0.681
0.679
(0.018)** (0.019)*** (0.024)*** (0.189)*** (0.248)***
-0.001
-0.005
-0.006
(0.002) (0.002)** (0.003)**
0.004
0.002
0.008
(0.003)
(0.003) (0.004)**
-0.001
(0.004)

-0.011
0.012
(0.005)** (0.007)*

-

-
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Table VI, continued
Debt and Equity
ln(Aget=0)

0.015
(0.007)**

0.012
(0.011)

ln(BMt=0)

-

-

ln(Sizet=0)
Constant

-0.013
-0.007
(0.004)*** (0.005)
-

-

-0.016
-0.013
(0.005)*** (0.009)
-

-

-0.437
-0.574
-0.471
(0.145)*** (0.221)*** (0.171)***

0.082
(0.211)

-0.817
-0.917
-0.523
-0.584
(0.152)*** (0.199)*** (0.153)*** (0.208)***

0.615
0.632
1.062
1.037
(0.081)*** (0.125)*** (0.091)*** (0.124)***
0.752
0.680
0.135
0.082
0.242
0.167
1.379
1.208
0.190
-2.983
(0.037)*** (0.054)*** (0.018)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.036)*** (0.610)** (0.670)*
(0.720)
(0.832)***

Industry Effects Included
IPO-Year Effects Included
Adjusted R2
F-Stat
N

0.07
14.72
3503

0.12
15.17
1668

0.04
8.16
3527

0.07
22.58
1680

0.06
11.43
3525

0.07
14.48
1681

0.30
15.08
585

0.30
8.10
283

0.33
12.96
427

0.34
8.53
214

33
Table VII

Impact on the High-Tech Sector
Table VII reports the share of high-tech sales, R&D and market value that venture- and nonventure-backed firms from the 1980s accounted for in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2003. Aggregates
for the high-tech sector are computed by summing across all publicly traded firms in SICs 283,
357, 366, 367, 382, 384 and 737 with coverage in Compustat. Results are reported separately for
the full and matched samples of high-tech IPOs (described in Section II).
Matched Sample
I.
Full Sample
Share of Sales
1990
1995
2000
2003
Share of R&D
1990
1995
2000
2003

II.

VC

VC

NVC

NVC

0.151
0.183
0.192
0.163

0.027
0.021
0.013
0.010

0.030
0.036
0.051
0.058

0.016
0.012
0.007
0.007

0.198
0.219
0.163
0.153

0.020
0.017
0.009
0.008

0.050
0.053
0.061
0.067

0.012
0.010
0.005
0.004

0.151
0.194
0.208
0.197

0.022
0.023
0.019
0.007

0.055
0.085
0.096
0.102

0.016
0.013
0.004
0.005
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